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Good afternoon. It is an honor to comment upon the remarks of 
Dr. Jakob Kellenberger, President of the International Committee of 
the Red Cross. This lecture, named for one of international law’s 
founding fathers, and cosponsored by the American University 
Washington College of Law and the American Society of 
International Law, has become a much-anticipated highlight of the 
Society’s annual meeting. Thank you, President Caron, Professor 
Hunter, and Dean Grossman for the opportunity to serve as a 
discussant this afternoon; thank you Dr. Kellenberger for your 
important and thoughtful lecture; and thank you, distinguished 
listeners, for your kind attention.  
The theme of today’s Grotius lecture is the importance of law in 
confronting the complexity of violence, and, more specifically, the 
role of international humanitarian law in confronting the complexity 
of armed conflict. In his masterful survey of the work of the ICRC, 
guardian of the Geneva conventions, as well as the challenges it 
faces in carrying out its mandate, Dr. Kellenberger has suggested that 
three ideas should inform our efforts to address these complexities: 
(i) a commitment to reason and understanding, (ii) a sense of vision 
that helps us understand where we would like to go and illuminates 
the path we must choose to get there, and (iii) a commitment to our 
common humanity.  
I cannot in the time allotted to me do justice to the breadth and 
depth of Dr. Kellenberger’s lecture but can perhaps suggest points 
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for discussion as regards all three of these fundamental ideas and 
contextualize them further. As for reason, Dr. Kellenberger’s 
remarks assume that law—legal rules and international institutions—
can moderate the effects of violence in the world, whether that 
violence emerges from interstate conflicts or, as is more commonly 
the case now, non-international armed conflicts with or without an 
extraterritorial element. I share this assumption and, because time is 
short, will not comment further upon it, other than to observe, as Dr. 
Kellenberger himself admits, that law alone is insufficient to restrain 
violence, and that increased emphasis must be placed upon 
prevention, education, and increased international cooperation and 
understanding if the suffering of humanity is to be alleviated. The 
power and effectiveness of international law has been hotly contested 
by scholars, at least in the United States. Yet it would seem a 
common-sense proposition that the inverse situation—a world 
without law—would be the kind of Hobbesian world in which life is 
nasty, brutish, and short—rather like the battlefield of Solferino in 
1863—and the kind of world that most of us would rather not 
inhabit.  
As for humanity, Dr. Kellenberger’s lecture quite fittingly evokes 
and renders homage to some of the European founders of 
international humanitarian law, whose ideas and writings have 
illuminated many dark corners of human behavior, and have 
continued salience today. Yet his remarks were perhaps too modest. 
The International Red Cross and Red Crescent movement is the 
world’s largest humanitarian network, with more than 97 million 
volunteers, supporters, and staff in 186 countries.1 The ICRC itself 
has more than 12,000 staff in 80 countries around the world.2 From 
the earliest days of its founding by a group of five Genevan 
personalities that included Henry Dunant himself (author of A 
Memory of Solferino), the ICRC has embraced universality as a 
guiding principle and has held many of its international conferences 
outside of Europe, in Tokyo, New Delhi, Istanbul, Teheran, and 
Manila, in addition to Geneva and Vienna. I am reminded of Judge 
Christopher Weeramantry’s dissent in the Nuclear Weapons 
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Advisory Opinion, which observed that the concept of humanitarian 
law is neither a recent invention nor the product of any one culture. It 
is, rather, of “ancient origin” with a lineage stretching back at least 
three millennia and deeply rooted in many cultures including Hindu, 
Buddhist, Chinese, Christian, Islamic, Jewish, and traditional 
African.3  
As for vision, I would like to explore Dr. Kellenberger’s invitation 
to adopt new norms to make international humanitarian law more 
complete and effective. As is characteristic of the ICRC’s general 
approach, he has proposed important, but incremental, changes to 
enhance the effectiveness of international humanitarian law by filling 
gaps in the current regime. These suggested improvements involve 
establishing more and better rules on detention in non-international 
armed conflict and establishing more effective monitoring and 
compliance mechanisms specific to the needs of international 
humanitarian law, which could be undertaken by someone or some 
entity other than the ICRC. He has also—quite diplomatically—
suggested that states should follow the current rules more closely, 
rather than reject them or withdraw from them, actions which 
introduce additional complexities into the infrastructure of 
international humanitarian law and weakens it considerably. These 
suggestions are consistent with the mission and mandate of the 
ICRC, which rests upon a commitment to the principles of neutrality 
and confidentiality, principles that have guaranteed the ICRC’s 
successes through the decades, but which may also, as Dr. 
Kellenberger acknowledges, hamper the ICRC’s effectiveness in 
enhancing compliance with international humanitarian law by state 
and non-state actors. His remarks quite sensibly target Geneva law—
the texts entrusted specifically to the ICRC as guardian—but take 
note of the important role of the ICRC regarding the formation and 
codification of the customary international law of war, including the 
law of The Hague and of weapons conventions, as well.  
Yet the notion of international humanitarian law as a tool of legal 
repression is broader than the laws of war, and the question arises 
whether incremental change is sufficient, or whether our vision 
should include other very significant areas of human suffering and 
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harm. In the short time remaining, I would like to at least raise the 
question whether we do not need, at the current stage of the world’s 
civilization, to complete norms addressing other aspects of 
international humanitarian law, including crimes against humanity 
and crimes against peace. When the Security Council adopted a 
Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia in 1993, it was a Statute that granted the ICTY the power 
to prosecute persons responsible for “serious violations of 
international humanitarian law,” including not only war crimes, but 
genocide (article 4) and crimes against humanity (article 5).4 
Building upon the Nuremberg Charter itself, the Kampala 
amendments to the ICC Statute added to this trio of crimes the crime 
of aggression—albeit not until 2017 at the earliest and only as 
regards states agreeing to its inclusion.5 Thus, it may be useful to 
expand our vision to consider how these areas of international 
humanitarian law may be in need of development as well, and how 
their development might assist with the critical goals of prevention 
and compliance enhancement identified by today’s lecture.  
With respect to crimes against humanity, that crime, so important 
at Nuremberg and vital to the work of the ad hoc international 
criminal tribunals and the ICC, has never been made the object of a 
comprehensive international codification. Having been “de-linked” 
from armed conflict by the judgment of the ICTY in the Tadić case,6 
as well as in the negotiations that resulted in its inclusion as article 7 
of the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court,7 crimes 
against humanity enhance international humanitarian law’s 
effectiveness by criminalizing widespread or systematic attacks upon 
civilians even prior to the onset of armed conflict. In the work of the 
ICC, we see the importance of crimes against humanity not only as 
parallel charges during times of armed conflict, as appear in the 
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Katanga and Bemba cases, but as the only source of law applicable 
in the charges brought in the Libya and Kenya situations. Crimes 
against humanity as a category of incrimination prohibits mass 
atrocities—including persecution and ethnic cleansing—that take 
place prior to, during, or even following an armed conflict. The 
failure of the international community to take up CAH’s codification 
is perhaps reflective of the first category of problematic state 
behavior noted in Dr. Kellenberger’s lecture, that of abstention or 
failure to respond to a problem. A group of distinguished experts 
working under the auspices of the Harris Institute at Washington 
University recently drafted a proposed international convention for 
the prevention and punishment of crimes against humanity, but no 
state has yet taken up the challenge of spearheading an effort to get 
such a convention adopted.8 It may not be within the ICRC’s 
purview to take up a project like this, but it is certainly related to the 
work of the ICRC in alleviating human suffering during conflict, 
whether armed or not, as the thirty-first international conference 
recently noted. 
A second important gap in international humanitarian law is the 
absence of an effective prohibition against the crime of aggression. 
In A Memory of Solferino, Dunant wrote of the terrible suffering of 
soldiers, which was a catalyst for the ICRC’s founding in Geneva. 
For that great battle of 1859 between Austria, on the one hand, and 
France and Sardinia, on the other, left 6,000 soldiers dead, with 
another 30,000 wounded, who were suffering from the most 
appalling injuries. Crimes against humanity protect civilian 
populations from the depredations of war or other widespread or 
systematic human rights abuses, but it is the crime of aggression that 
protects combatants, who may otherwise be made the lawful target of 
military operations. While the laws of war endeavor to protect them 
from unnecessary suffering, they cannot save them from death. 
Think of the chilling example given by Judge Schwebel—also in the 
Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion—that a lawful use of a nuclear 
weapon would include targeting—and thereby incinerating—an army 
in a desert.9 Less dramatically, the recent incident between North and 
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South Korea resulted in the death of forty-six sailors.  
The ICRC, of course, is bound by its mandates of confidentiality 
and neutrality not to take sides, and labeling a particular use of force 
“unlawful” inevitably results in a legal assessment that one side (at 
least) was improper in its resort to violence. So perhaps it is 
preferable, in the imperfect world in which we live, to focus upon 
making conflicts more humane and civilized rather than attempting 
to distinguish between lawful and unlawful uses of force. Certainly, 
Clara Barton thought so; a passionate advocate for the ratification of 
the Geneva Convention of 1864 by the United States, she wrote in an 
address she gave just after the United States ratified the treaty in 
1882 that the international convention at Geneva had considered two 
problems—the existence of war and the vast amount of needless 
cruelty it inflicted upon its victims.10 The former problem, she wrote, 
could hardly be mitigated other than by “time, prolonged effort, 
national economics, universal progress and the pressure of public 
opinion.” The latter, however, could be and was undertaken in 1864, 
and the establishment of the Geneva Convention and the ICRC was 
the result. It is true that, unlike the codification of crimes against 
humanity or war crimes, the codification of the crime of aggression 
comes closer to outlawing violence altogether, rather than simply 
mitigating its more pernicious forms. Yet in a post-Hiroshima age, 
there is perhaps more urgency in addressing not only the byproducts 
of war, but war itself. This burden must perhaps be taken up by 
entities other than the ICRC, but it represents a great unfinished work 
of humanity.  
Finally, given the venue of today’s lecture, it is perhaps 
appropriate to comment upon one additional aspect of today’s 
Grotius lecture, and that is the role of major powers such as the 
United States in complying with their obligations under international 
humanitarian law. As we learn from Clara Barton’s writings in 1898, 
the entry of the United States into the Geneva Convention of 1864 
was not easily accomplished; President Garfield supported the treaty 
but noted the difficulties of convincing the Senate to do the same.11 
Clara was not a well woman, and yet she committed herself to 
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bringing the United States on board, so passionately did she believe 
in the principles of Geneva.12 She advocated for the treaty before 
Congress and finally, in 1882, the United States acceded to the 
treaty, making it the thirty-second country to do so.13 Perhaps it is 
comforting to know that what seems to be a phenomenon of modern 
politics and resistance to international law in the United States is 
instead a venerable American tradition—and that plus ça change, 
plus ça reste pareil (the more things change, the more they stay the 
same). But just as the impassioned advocacy and dedication of Miss 
Clara Barton helped to convince a reluctant Congress of the 
importance of the 1864 Convention, I am sure that the eloquent 
remarks of Dr. Kellenberger before this important gathering of 
international lawyers will be of great effect. Solving the challenges 
he has identified will indeed require vision; this is also true as 
regards the additional challenges I have identified. But vision alone 
is not enough. Just last December, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-
moon spoke at a reception hosted by the CICC in honor of the 
International Criminal Court and quipped, “at the United Nations, we 
don’t believe in miracles, but in hard work. But sometimes small 
miracles occur.”14 The same could be said by and about the ICRC for 
whose tireless and quiet work on behalf of humanity we must indeed 
be most grateful, and which has produced many small and large 
miracles over the many decades of its existence—prisoners reunited 
with their families, amelioration of conditions of detention, the 
banning of weapons causing unnecessary suffering, and the 
mitigation of violence in the world. Thank you, Dr. Kellenberger, for 
your tireless advocacy on behalf of humanity, and thank you, 
distinguished guests, for your kind attention.  
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